

# Martin Vaeth

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**Graduate Administrator** Laura Hedden [lhedden@princeton.edu](mailto:lhedden@princeton.edu) 609-258-4006

## Graduate Studies

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**Princeton University** *2019-present*

PhD Candidate in Economics

Expected Completion Date: May 2025

### REFERENCES

Roland Bénabou	Alessandro Lizzeri	Fedor Sandomirskiy
Department of Economics	Department of Economics	Department of Economics
Princeton University	Princeton University	Princeton University
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## Prior Education

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**London School of Economics and Political Science** *2018*

M.Sc. in Economics and Philosophy

**Heidelberg University** *2017*

B.Sc. in Mathematics

## Fields

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PRIMARY Microeconomic Theory

SECONDARY Behavioral Economics, Political Economy

## Job Market Paper

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[“Rational Voter Learning, Issue Alignment, and Polarization”](#), 2024

*We model electoral competition between two parties when voters can learn about their political opinion through flexibly acquiring costly information. In equilibrium, learning creates polarized political preferences that are aligned across policy issues, even when the true distribution of ideal points is unimodal and independent across policy issues. When party positions are strategically chosen, voter and party polarization are mutually reinforcing, and both increase as information becomes less costly to acquire. Because voters learn only about the axis of disagreement between parties, policy platforms respond to only one dimension of aggregate shocks to voter preferences. Adapting our model to a market setting with horizontally differentiated goods, a lower cost of information translates not only to more product differentiation but also to higher markups, reducing consumer welfare.*

## Working Papers

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1. “Attention and Regret”, 2023, Revise and Resubmit at *Journal of Political Economy*.
2. “Imprecision Attenuates Updating”, 2024

## Work in Progress

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1. “Designing Image Incentives”, 2024
2. “Self-Control through Emotions: Guilt and Pride”, 2024

## Teaching

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*Princeton University* ECO 500: Mathematics for Economists (TA, 2024)  
ECO 100: Introduction to Microeconomics (TA, 2022, 2023, 2024)

*Heidelberg University* Linear Algebra (TA, 2016)

## Professional Activities

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### External Presentations

- 2024 35th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory
- 2023 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, Bonn Microeconomic Theory Seminar
- 2022 Calgary/SFU/UBC Theory Workshop

### Refereeing

*American Economic Review, Journal of Mathematical Economics*

## Fellowships, Awards, and Grants

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Stephen Goldfeld Summer Fellowship	2024
William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Summer Grants	2021-2024
Global Priorities Fellowship, Forethought Foundation	2020
Hayek prize for best performance in the MSc Economics and Philosophy at LSE	2018
Scholarship by the German Academic Scholarship Foundation	2014-2018
Scholarship to study in China by the German Academic Exchange Service	2014-2015
Deutschlandstipendium scholarship	2013-2014

## Languages

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FLUENT German (native), English

BASIC French, Spanish, Chinese

*Last updated: October 2024*